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Research-in-progress
Abstract
Human compliance in cybersecurity continues to be
a persistent problem for organizations. This researchin-progress advances theoretical understanding of the
negative effects of trust formed between individuals
and the cybersecurity function (i.e., those responsible
for protection), cybersecurity system (i.e., the
protective technologies), and organization (i.e., those
verifying (e.g., hiring, championing, vouching.) the
cybersecurity department) that leads to suboptimal
compliance behaviors. In contrast to the current
information security literature that focuses on how
organizations can induce compliance, this study begins
to provide understanding into the degradation of
compliance
through
organizational
actions.
Additionally, understanding is provided on how to
combat the negative effects of trust. An integrated
model is conceptualized using the theories of trust and
attention. This model provides the theoretical
foundation to study the role of dark side trust in the
context of cybersecurity and provides initial
mechanisms to reduce it. By developing this
conceptualization of dark side trust and model, this
study contributes to the general study of trust in
information systems research outside of the domain of
cybersecurity.

1. Introduction
Organizations are increasingly developing more
complex cybersecurity ecosystems that rely on people,
technology, and processes to function effectively [34].
Information security research (ISec) has identified the
criticality of studying human compliance behavior in
cybersecurity ecosystems [8]. ISec research studied
human compliance using a rich theoretical base such as
deterrence [10, 39], motivation [7, 23], fear [22],
accountability
[44],
and
mindfulness
[21].
Interestingly, there has been little research attention
directed at the role of trust in human compliance in the
context of cybersecurity.
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Trust in information systems (IS) research has
largely been shown to be positive in different contexts
such as electronic markets [2], e-commerce [40],
website design [9], and online social networks [3].
Trust though has also been conceptualized and shown
to result in negative consequences [12, 34, 37, 50] as
individuals may maintain trust unconditionally and
over and above evidence to the contrary [12]. Trust,
therefore, has been shown to have a “bright” and
“dark” side stimulating both positive and negative
consequences for individuals and organizations.
Similar to the context of project management, trust like
commitment can be beneficial and detrimental.
Escalating commitment can lead to detrimental
consequences by continually absorbing resources
without delivering benefits [24, 25]. Trust like
commitment can potentially lead to detrimental
consequences in contexts rife with risk, uncertainty,
and vulnerability like cybersecurity.
The dark side of trust, which we refer to as when an
individual maintains trust unconditionally despite
contradictory relevant stimuli, is important in the
context of cybersecurity as it can be detrimental to the
defense of cyber-attacks. For example, in
cybersecurity, one with dark side trust may trust that
the cybersecurity system will filter all phishing emails
and therefore not correctly identify malicious emails
even though stimuli (e.g., an unsecure domain,
incorrect domain address, request for urgent
confidential) should alert them otherwise. Conversely,
bright side trust, when an individual maintains trust
until presented with contradictory relevant stimuli, can
be beneficial. Individuals with bright side trust,
contrarily, may identify a malicious email that
bypasses
cybersecurity
countermeasures
when
presented with stimuli that alert them the email is
unsafe.
Trust, be it dark or bright, is a highly relevant
mechanism in understanding mitigation of uncertainty
between people, organizations, and technology [33].
When individuals are in situations of uncertainty, risk,
and vulnerability, like during cyber-attacks they tend to
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rely on agents (e.g., cybersecurity department,
cybersecurity system) they trust to guide behaviors.
When relying on trusting agents it is conceivable that it
may result in negative outcomes thus trust’s dark side
manifests. In this research-in-progress, we provide
understanding of the role of dark side trust in high-risk
contexts like cybersecurity as the consequences can be
detrimental to the individual, organization, and society
as a whole.
ISec research has a rich theoretical and practical
understanding of how to facilitate compliance through
mechanisms such as motivation [22, 23],
accountability [44, 45], and deterrence[10, 16, 39],
amongst others. Interestingly, existing ISec research
has yet to fully understand how organizations can
inhibit human compliance through mechanisms like
dark side trust as implied above. In this research-inprogress study, we investigate the dark side of trust in
cybersecurity and its inhibiting effect on human
compliance. In doing so, we develop a conceptual
model on cybersecurity trust, attention to
cybersecurity, and compliance behaviors. We examine
the following research question:
How does dark side trust inhibit compliance in the
context of cybersecurity?
This research-in-progress contributes to ISec
literature and practice in several ways. This research
builds upon dark side trust in the context of
cybersecurity [34] by studying its effect on attention
paid to cybersecurity as a mechanism to reduce
compliance. This begins to provide understanding of
how organizations can inadvertently reduce
compliance.
Insight is also provided into the
moderating roles of cybersecurity mindfulness,
suspicion, and intention to protect between trust and
attention and how they can combat dark side trust. The
study also contributes to the IS literature in general, by
building upon the pervious conceptualizations of the
nuances of trust, that trust is not always beneficial.

From a practical perspective, this study will enable
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs),
cybersecurity managers, and system designers to
understand how to protect against dark side trust in
cybersecurity. By providing understanding into the
moderating role of cybersecurity mindfulness,
suspicion, and intention to protect this study allows
cybersecurity stakeholders to incorporate these three
levers into training and system design to increase
attention for compliance and alleviate the dark side of
trust detrimental consequences.

2. Trust In Cybersecurity
Trusting relationships have been studied from four
primary perspectives between 1) people and groups 2)
people and organizations 3) organizations, and 4)
people and technology [38]. Cybersecurity and proper
defense though relies on the individual trusting the
technology (i.e., cybersecurity system), people (i.e.,
cybersecurity department), and the organization. Each
of these trusting agents can deploy cybersecurity
countermeasures that an individual can rely on to
prevent and defend against cyber-attacks.
In the context of cybersecurity, an organization can
develop legal strategies to prosecute, terminate, or
discipline individuals to use fear to motivate
identification and protective behaviors. The
cybersecurity function can provide training for
individuals to call upon to identify and protect against
a cyber-attack. The cybersecurity system can filter and
identify malicious files or emails to warn and notify the
user of potential harm. Collectively, these different
trusting agents can shape the individual’s trusting
beliefs about cybersecurity. We, therefore, posit that
trust in cybersecurity is a multidimensional
superordinate construct comprised of trust in the
cybersecurity function, cybersecurity system, and
organization (Figure 1).
In conceptualizing trust in cybersecurity as a
multidimensional superordinate construct we adapt and

Figure 1. Trust in Cybersecurity as Multidimensional Superordinate Construct
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contextualize items for trust in the cybersecurity
function, trust in the organization, as well as develop
new measures and dimensions for trust in a
cybersecurity system. Trust in the cybersecurity
function relates to those responsible for protecting the
individual with the dimensions of benevolence,
competence, and reliability [15, 30, 38, 40].
Institutional trust in cybersecurity relates to the beliefs
the individual has about cybersecurity in the
organizational protective context [29] with the
dimensions of situational normality and structural
assurances. Trust in the cybersecurity system relates to
how the individual believes he or she is safeguarded by
protective technologies from a cyber-attack [29].
Trust in the cybersecurity function was adapted
from trust in a specific technology. Trust in a specific
technology was conceptualized as users’ perceptions of
technology attributes. McKnight et al. [29] included
system-like constructs of reliability, functionality, and
helpfulness, which were derived from integrity,
competence, and predictability [29]. Similar to the
conceptualization of trust in a specific technology we
argue that trust in cybersecurity system elicits different
system-like attributes since it primarily serves as a
protective technology. We adapt new dimensions that
are derived from reliability, functionality, and
helpfulness and incorporate the CIA triad
(confidentiality, integrity, availability) of security into
trust in cybersecurity system dimensions of reliability,
confidentiality, and availability (Table 1). Reliability is
the assurance that confidential information and
computing resources are protected. Confidentiality is
that access to confidential information and computing
resources is restricted to only those who need it.
Availability is the guarantee of access to confidential
information and computing resources by authorized
persons when necessary. Overall we posit that this new
conceptualization of trust in cybersecurity reflects the
holistic socio-technical nature of trust in various
cybersecurity countermeasures elicited by different
facets of the organization.

2.1 Dark Side Trust in Cybersecurity
When an individual extends trust they are
effectively assuming risk, uncertainty, and making
himself or herself vulnerable to the trustee [11, 18, 33].
Establishing trust allows an individual to close
informational gaps in situations of risk, uncertainty,
and vulnerability by abdicating responsibility to the
trustee [15]. This indicates that issues of concern like
uncertainty and risk can be quelled when trust is placed
in a trustor.
In mitigating uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability IS
research has found that trust is a key factor in reducing
concerns of information privacy, information security,
and opportunism concerns in an e-commerce context
[33]. Taking an agency perspective, in the context of ecommerce, Pavlou et al. [33] found that sellers send
signals by posting information security policies,
explaining information security technologies, and third
party-verification of information security practices.
These pre-contract signals, in turn, lead to trusting
beliefs by buyers and mitigate information security
concerns. Pavlou et al. [33] also found post-contract
incentives play a role as high-quality sellers have
reason to safeguard information security due to
reputational concerns. Similarly, in the context of
cybersecurity, the cybersecurity function sends trusting
signals and has incentives to mitigate cyber-attacks in
the organization. For example, the cybersecurity
function implements information security and safe
computing policies, explains the purpose of and
provides protective technologies via the cybersecurity
system, and the organization verifies the cybersecurity
function and system via support. Additionally, the
cybersecurity function has incentives to mitigate cyberattacks due to reputational concerns.
Frequently, individuals are tasked with the making
decisions fraught with uncertainty, risk, and
vulnerability during the course of cyber-attacks. Trust
allows individuals to reduce feelings of uncertainty,
risk, and vulnerability by placing trust in the
cybersecurity
function,
system,
and/or
the
organization. For example, social engineered cyber-

Table 1. Trust in cybersecurity system dimensions
Trust Between People (McKnight et
Trust in a Specific Technology
al. 2011)
(McKnight et al. 2011)
Competence – The efficacy of the
trustee to fulfill a promise in terms of
their ability or power to do something
for us (McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5)
Benevolence – When the trustee cares
enough to offer help when needed
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5)

Functionality - whether one expects a
technology to have the capacity or
capability to complete a required task
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5)
Helpfulness – if the help function of
the technology is adequate and
responsive (McKnight et al. 2011, p.
12:5)

Integrity – The hope that trustees are
consistent, predictable, and reliable
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5)

Reliability – the technology works
consistently and predictably
(McKnight et al. 2011, p. 12:5)

Trust in a Cybersecurity System
(This paper)
Confidentiality - access to
confidential information and
computing resources is restricted to
only those who need it
Availability - the guarantee of
access to confidential information
and computing resources by
authorized persons when
necessary
Reliability - the assurance that
confidential information and
computing resources are
protected
Page
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attack like phishing attempt to psychological
manipulate individuals by acting as a trusted entity
[19]. Individuals, when faced with a socially
engineered phishing email, may defer the decision
regarding if the email is safe to a trusting agent. They
may trust that 1) the cybersecurity system did not filter
the email therefore the email is safe, 2) the
cybersecurity function did not block the sender or
notify of phishing threats therefore the email is safe,
and 3) the intimate details of the operation of the
organization or branding are in the context of the email
therefore it is safe. While these may raise red flags and
elicit the bright side of trust in enacting proper defense
(e.g., checking the domain for safety, reviewing the
sender email address rather than relying on the email
header, etc.) there may also be negative consequences
due to the dark side of trust. The dark side of trust
could manifest resulting in the failure of the individual
to identify the phishing email as they abdicate
responsibility to trusting agents. This could result in
the individual providing confidential information (e.g.,
username and passwords), downloading a malicious
file, or even responding and wiring funds to a
cybercriminal.
Overall, the dark side of trust in management
literature has been found to have negative
consequences for individuals and organizations such as
allowing unethical behavior [50], overreliance on
automation [27], poor judgment [13], management
complacency [26], and underperformance [32]. In light
of this understanding in management literature, little
attention has been paid to the dark side of trust in ISec
and IS research. The dark side of trust therefore, could
have negative consequences in high-risk situations like
cybersecurity as it may alleviate individuals’
cybersecurity concerns in an organization and reduce
compliance behaviors.

3. Attention to Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is riddled with failures of the human
element with almost 90 percent of attacks relying on
deceiving humans [52]. For example, the Equifax data
breach of 2017 could have been avoided had humans
updated security patches when released in March 2017.
The cyber-attack was launched from May to June
2017, yet the breach was not discovered until the end
of July 2017 and by that time it is estimated 143
million records had been breached [53].
One of the primary purposes of cybersecurity
ecosystems is the detection and identification of
malicious cyber-attacks [31]. These systems rely on
socio-technical countermeasures to detect, identify, and
respond in mitigating an attack. Cybersecurity systems
use technical means like information security warnings

to engage users and elicit pro-cybersecurity behaviors
[43]. Recently, ISec research has turned to collective
intelligence via knowledge management systems to
leverage the human element by creating human
firewalls in identifying malicious email [20].
Leveraging humans and engaging them as an effective
countermeasure has proven elusive since it requires
them to pay attention to information security warnings,
phishing emails, information security training, and
notifications [21, 36, 45, 48, 49].
When humans, a key component of cybersecurity
defense, fail to detect cyber-attacks that bypass
technical countermeasures the individual and
organization are subject to detrimental consequences.
ISec research has found that security is not a priority
for individuals [17]. Additionally, there is little
understanding of basic cybersecurity and associated
countermeasures [51]. Inherently, this shows that
individuals are not concerned about cybersecurity or do
not understand it.
To combat the tendency to ignore cybersecurity,
ISec research has turned its attention to how
individuals tune out information security warnings [1,
43, 45]. In a series of studies, it was found that over
time individuals become habituated to repeated
security warnings and thus fail to engage with them.
Polymorphic design of information security warnings
was found to decrease habituation and increase
adherence to said warnings [1, 43]. This research
shows that individuals over time are vulnerable to
paying less attention to information security warnings.
Thus garnering the attention of individuals in
cybersecurity is critical in the effective detection,
response, and mitigation of cyber-attacks.

4. Compliance
Human compliance in cybersecurity has received
substantial attention from a diverse array of theoretical
lenses, yet is still an elusive problem for academics and
practice. As stated previously, ISec research has noted
the criticality of behavioral security and the importance
of inducing compliance behaviors in the effective
defense of cyber-attacks. [8].
Security compliance policies and associated
security education, training, and awareness programs
are designed to provide guidance for individuals to
protect the organization [22]. A commonality amongst
these policies and programs is that it allows the
cybersecurity function to articulate and demonstrate
expectations
for
individual
pro-cybersecurity
behaviors. When individuals fail to engage in these
compliance behaviors the organization is at risk.
Although, we have a rich understanding of what drives
compliance behaviors theoretically such as fear [22],

Page 4267

accountability [44], and deterrence [10], ISec research
regarding what lessens these behaviors is still relatively
new. Therefore, understanding what diminishes
individuals to engage in cybersecurity compliance, like
dark side trust is important for future ISec research.

5. Cybersecurity Mindfulness,
Cybersecurity Suspicion, and Intention to
Protect
Mindfulness and suspicion are concepts that are
similar in that they engage users in cognitive activation
[5, 6, 20, 41]. Although similar, there are distinct
individual differences between the constructs in that
mindfulness does not require the element of malicious
intent, while suspicion does. For instance, an
individual can engage in mindful behaviors even if
they do not sense they will be harmed, while suspicion
does not rise unless the individual believes they will be
harmed. Mindfulness invokes engagement with users
in one dimension through awareness of multiple
perspectives [41]. Conversely, suspicion invokes
engagement through the dimension of cognitive
activation, where the individual mentally conjectures
multiple explanations for harm [6]. For instance, in
identifying phishing emails an individual that is
mindful might engage in the multiple perspectives
related to past compliance training, while an individual
that is suspicious may inherently question all emails
looking for alternative explanations of why the email
can be harming above and beyond what he or she has
been trained for. Regardless, both mindfulness and
suspicion in cybersecurity further engage individuals in
deeper thinking.
Individuals with an intention to protect may be
more likely to engage in compliance behaviors.
Intention has been shown to be a key factor in driving
behavior [46, 47]. Past ISec and IS research has shown
the strength of this relationship and those that have a
positive behavioral intention are more likely to engage
in subsequent behaviors [7, 23, 36, 46, 47]. Therefore,

those that have an intention to protect may be more
likely to engage in more concentrated efforts for
cybersecurity.

6. Research Model
We draw on the theoretical bases of trust,
attention, and compliance behaviors to build an
integrative model of the consequences of dark side
trust in cybersecurity (Figure 2). In this view, we
propose that dark side trust in cybersecurity lessens
attention to cybersecurity and subsequent compliance
behaviors. Bright trust, in general, has been shown as a
mechanism that lessens concern in situations of
uncertainty, vulnerability, and risk for beneficial
consequences [33]. This model, in turn, posits that dark
side trust can have the same effects in that it can
alleviate concerns for cybersecurity causing individuals
attention to cybersecurity to decrease and thus making
them more susceptible to cyber-attacks since security
compliance behaviors are not followed. Table 2
presents the model constructs and definitions.
Trust and its beneficial side is shown to have
positive outcomes in the contexts of e-commerce [2,
33, 40], social networks [3], and recommendation
agents [4]. In these contexts, trust has been shown to
mitigate uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability leading to
improved exchanges between the trustee and the
trustor. Specifically, Pavlou et al. [33] found that trust
mitigated uncertainty related to information security in
online shopping. Customers’ perceptions of risk in
information security were reduced the more they
trusted the organization thus increasing purchasing
intentions [33]. Similar to this dark side trust can
mitigate individuals concerns for cybersecurity in an
organization due to trust in cybersecurity.
We suspect that individuals may not be concerned
about cybersecurity in the organization since they trust
the cybersecurity function, system, and organization
prevent cyber-attacks. Therefore, individuals may not
pay attention to cybersecurity since they trust

Figure 2. Dark side trust research model
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cybersecurity agents in the organization will have
taken care of mitigating cyber-attacks. Additionally,
trust in cybersecurity may cause individuals not to
engage in cybersecurity compliance behaviors again
since it is not of their concern.
H1: The dark side of trust in cybersecurity has a
negative (i.e., de-intensifies) relationship with a)
attention to cybersecurity and b) compliance in
protection.
Cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and an
individual’s intention to protect all may increase the
level of attention an individual directs at cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity mindfulness and suspicion have both
been shown to increase the identification of cyberattacks. Jensen et al. [21] showed that training
individuals in phishing mindfulness increases their
ability to avoid falling victim to phishing attacks. Gay
et al. [14] found increasing suspicion in military drone
vehicles lead to an improvement in identifying and
mitigating cyber-attacks on the systems running the
drones. As noted previously, each of these constructs
includes cognitive activation that engages the user,
mindfulness through multiple perspectives in training
compliance and suspicion through cognitively
assessing a harmful situation for alternative
explanations for how, when, and why a cyber-attack is
happening thus eliciting vulnerability. Intention to
protect has also been shown in IS research to be a
positive predictor of behavior. We therefore posit that
cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to
protect will negatively moderate the relationship
between dark side trust and attention to cybersecurity.
H2a: Cybersecurity mindfulness negatively moderates
(i.e., de-intensifies) the relationship between the dark
side of trust in cybersecurity and attention to
cybersecurity.
H2b: Cybersecurity suspicion negatively moderates
(i.e., de-intensifies) the relationship between dark side
of trust in cybersecurity and attention to cybersecurity.
H2c: Intention to protect negatively moderates (i.e, deintensifies) the relationship between the dark side of
trust in cybersecurity and attention to cybersecurity.
Getting members in an organization to pay attention
to cybersecurity is a concern for ISec researchers and
practice. Vance et al. [43] showed that individuals
over time stop paying attention over time to
information security warnings as they become
habituated to them. By changing design principles in
the information security warning they showed that

individuals were more attentive to the warning.
Practice has also shown that although cybersecurity is
a concern and widely prevalent in organizations a large
number of people do not understand basic concepts
[51].
Garnering
individuals’
attention
toward
cybersecurity is therefore important in eliciting
compliance in protection. For instance, those that pay
attention to phishing emails may identify them and
subsequently forward them to the cybersecurity
function or flag them within the system. Although,
those that do not pay attention may not engage in
requested compliance behaviors such as appropriately
reporting a phishing email. This is important to ISec
research as newer streams have shown the importance
of collective human efforts in defending and diffusing
cyber-attacks [20]. We therefore, propose that when
individuals direct attention to cybersecurity they are
more likely to engage in requested compliance
behaviors.
H3: Attention to cybersecurity has a positive (i.e.,
intensifies) relationship with compliance in protection.
Table 2. Construct definitions
Construct
Definition
Trust in
The degree to which an individual
Cybersecurity
believes he or she is safeguarded
from a cyber-attack [30]
Cybersecurity
A state of alertness and lively
Mindfulness
awareness in assessing threats to
sensitive and confidential
information [41]
Cybersecurity
A person’s simultaneous state of
Suspicion
cognitive activity, uncertainty, and
perceived malintent about
cybersecurity [6]
Intention to
The user’s intention to continue
Protect
protecting confidential information
[46]
Attention to
The process of directing our
Cybersecurity
awareness to relevant stimuli while
ignoring irrelevant stimuli in
cybersecurity
Compliance in
Behaviors that follow cybersecurity
Protection
compliance policies for protecting
confidential
information
and
computing resources

7. Proposed Method
As this is research-in-progress, data will be
collected in the near future in partnership with an
organization in the southeastern United States. The
research design for the full study will use a multimethod approach comprised of a survey, eye-tracking
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study and a field experiment to triangulate data in the
context of a phishing e-mail attack.
In partnership with our research site, training on
phishing was provided to individuals in Fall of 2019,
which included six heuristics or rules for individual to
follow in identifying phishing emails: 1) ensuring the
email header is legitimate 2) reviewing the domain
name for legitimacy 3) reviewing for generic
salutations 4) reviewing for spelling errors 5) looking
for urgent requests for sensitive information, and 6)
hovering and ensuring an embedded link or attached
file is legitimate [35]. The organization digitally tracks
all users that complete and do not complete the online
phishing training.
The survey is being developed through a literature
review of the trust, mindfulness, suspicion, attention,
and compliance literatures. When available, scales will
be adapted to the context of trust in cybersecurity [29],
mindfulness [41], suspicion [6], and attention [42].
Compliance behaviors will be operationalized with a
scale with items such as “I report suspected phishing
emails to the cybersecurity department” and “I do not
click on links unless they are deemed safe (i.e., the link
is noted as safe after hovering over it.)”.
To test the model, we will survey a sample of those
individuals requested to complete the training (i.e.,
those that did and did not). We will first measure trust
in
cybersecurity,
cybersecurity
mindfulness,
cybersecurity suspicion, and intention to protect. Items
for attention and compliance will be operationalized to
the above noted generalized phishing rules and
subsequent compliance behaviors. Validity and
reliability will be verified following established IS
guidelines [28].
We will then recruit subjects for a follow up study
from those that completed the survey and those that did
not. Eye-tracking technology will be used to
corroborate survey responses that individuals are in
fact paying attention to phishing emails during the
course of an experiment. The experiment will request
individuals to identify potential phishing emails. Eye
movements will be recorded to verify what an
individual looks at when attempting to identify an
email as malicious or legitimate.
Finally, we will conduct a simulated phishing
exercise to enact a breach at an organization with
simulated phishing software. This software provides
tracking mechanisms to obtain objective data on end
user compliance behaviors. Data will then be
triangulated from each phase of the research design.
7.1 Preliminary Pilot Test Findings
Since this is a research-in-progress study the full
study has yet to be finalized and started. However, to

test the preliminary instrument and research model, an
initial pilot test was conducted with 87 respondents
from a university in the South Eastern United States.
The research design for the pilot test consisted of
administering the pilot instrument to participants.
Participants were first presented with items measuring
trust in cybersecurity, cybersecurity mindfulness,
cybersecurity suspicion, and intention to protect.
Participants were then presented with the above noted
generalized phishing rules and shown the application
of the rules to example phishing emails. Subjects were
then presented with items regarding attention and
compliance that were operationalized to the six general
phishing heuristics. The results of the initial pilot test
were promising and provided some initial support for
the factor structure and model. At the time of
submission, the research team was working on
finalizing the instrument based on the pilot test results.

8. Analysis
Analysis will be done in multiple steps to assess the
validity of our research design. We will use structural
equation modeling (SEM), EQS 6.4 a covariance-based
SEM, for data analysis as the research model has latent
variables. We will examine the measurement model to
verify the instrument yields reliable and valid
measurements. We will then assess the structural
model to test the effects of dark side trust on attention
to cybersecurity and compliance for protection.
Additionally, we will assess the moderating effects of
cybersecurity mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to
protect between dark side trust in cybersecurity and
attention to cybersecurity. Objective data obtained
from eye-tracking and the field experiment will also be
analyzed.

9. Discussion
9.1 Theoretical Implications
Upon completion of this research-in-progress, this
study contributes to cybersecurity and the ISec
literature in several ways. While trust may be a key
enabler in the use of cybersecurity systems, research
has shown that dark side trust may result in negative
consequences [12, 13]. By studying this concept in the
context of cybersecurity we extend understanding of
trust and its adverse impact on individuals and
organizations to the ISec literature. Specifically, this
study sheds light on how organizations can reduce
mindless compliance due to dark side trust. The
integrated model of dark side trust provides an
explanatory framework for ISec literature to study the
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degradation of compliance and combatting of dark side
trust.
We introduce mindfulness and suspicion into
our model as a means to provide actionable
countermeasures for dark side trust. Of particular
interest is gaining insight into the construct of
suspicion [6, 14], which in this study begins to
understand its role in cyber-defense and compliance.
We provide understanding into the moderating role of
mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to protect and
seek to understand how they affect attention to
cybersecurity and subsequent compliance behaviors.
Although, the prior empirical findings show
the importance of attention, little work has extended
our understanding of its role in compliance beyond
information security warnings [1, 43, 45]. This
research will provide further understanding of the
interplay of trust and attention in cybersecurity as
mechanisms to control compliance behavior.
We also extend current research in
cybersecurity regarding trust, as we reconceptualize it
as a superordinate multi-dimensional construct
comprised of trust in people, technology, and the
organization. This new conceptualization will capture
the different nature of trust in cybersecurity influenced
by technology, people, and processes. New dimensions
of trust in a specific technology are also conceptualized
due to the unique context of cybersecurity.
Finally, IS research has been almost
exclusively about the benefits of trust for
organizations, individuals, online transactions and
technology [2, 4, 15, 30, 33, 40]. The existing body of
trust and information systems (IS) research has not
extensively explored the dark side of trust and its
negative consequences [34]. The dark side trust model
in this study may provide researchers outside of the
ISec community to study it in other contexts such as ecommerce,
virtual
teams,
and
outsourcing
relationships.
9.2 Practical Implications
This research-in-progress paper has several
potential implications for practices ranging from
training, design, and management. Training currently
has been emphasized as a solution to increasing
information
security
awareness.
This
paper
conceptually proposes the idea that the effects of
training, SETA, and notifications can be decreased
since it may encourage trust. Designs of cybersecurity
systems typically take a consistent iterative approach in
issuing warnings, notifications, and calls to action and
do not focus on failures of the function, system, or
organization. This paper may provide the impetus to
implement more malleable designs that engage the user

to process decisions more mindfully through the levers
of mindfulness, suspicion, and intention to protect. It
may also encourage CISOs and cybersecurity
managers to leverage the role of failure in training and
communications (e.g., showing that cybersecurity
function, system, and organization cannot prevent all
cyber-attacks) as a cybersecurity countermeasure to
combat dark side trust. Lastly, this paper shows that
trust must be protected by the cybersecurity department
and ensuring that individuals do not rely too heavily on
the function, system, and organization for protection.
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